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Summary:   The subject of the study is the analysis of the application of the Standard of Full 
Protection and Security of Foreign Investments in international arbitral practice. 
It is an absolute standard that is contained in almost all international investment 
agreements and that has been established through arbitration practice, regardless 
of the variety of language expressions referred to in investment agreements. The 
objects of protection under this Standard can be both investors and investments 
and it establishes a dual obligation for the states. On the one hand, there is 
the obligation of active action to prevent and remedy a violation or to punish 
perpetrators, and on the other hand, there is the obligation to refrain from any 
activities that may hurt foreign investment. This paper deals in particular with the 
three issues that are decisive for the application of the Standard in practice. The 
first is the issue of the relationship between this Standard and other standards of 
protection of foreign investments, in particular the Standard of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, as well as to the minimum standard of protection enjoyed by foreign 
investors and their investment under international customary law. The second is 
the issue of standard content, whether it applies only to physical protection and 
security, or includes wider, legal protection and regulatory protection, security 
and stability. The third question relates to the degree of protection and security, 
i.e. whether this Standard implies the objective liability of the host country or 
whether it has to deal with due diligence, depending on the circumstances of 
each case. The paper analyses all publicly available decisions of international 
arbitration tribunals as well as scientific literature dealing with this Standard 
and points out the prevailing attitudes about these three key issues as well as their 
implications for the protection of foreign investments.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Most investment contracts contain provisions that guarantee the protection and security 
of investments1. These provisions are in literature referred to as the full protection and security 
standard (in further text: FPSS). Traditionally, this standard was interpreted as the obligation 
for the country receiving the investment to implement measures for the protection of the inves-
tors and investments against physical threats. Over time, this interpretation was extended so 
that now the FPSS also includes legal protection and security in case of violation of the investor’s 
rights.2 This is an absolute standard, which means that it does not depend on how the state re-
ceiving the investment treats other investments or investors, and it is one of the most common 
investment and investor protection standards in international investment contracts.3 The FPSS 
establishes a dual obligation for the states: on the one hand, there is the obligation to actively 
participate in preventing and remedying violations or penalization of the wrongdoer, and on 
the other hand there is the obligation to refrain from any activities, “direct or indirect, with or 
without approval, that would infringe the foreign investment”.4 The reach of the FPSS cannot be 
easily determined, because the standard has evolved and changed over time.5 The standard has 
therefore been variously interpreted in the practice of arbitration tribunals,6 and the developed 
jurisprudence is controversial7 so that three key questions arise in the implementation of this 
standard. The first is the question of relation of this standard to other standards of protection, 
in particular to the fair and equitable treatment standard (in further text: FETS), and to the 
minimum standard of protection enjoyed by foreign investors and their investments according 
to customary international law. The second is the question of the content of the standard – 
whether the standard refers only to physical protection and security, or whether it also includes 
a wider, legal protection and regulatory protection, security and stability. The third question 
refers to the level of protection and security, i.e. whether this standard implies strict liability of 
the state receiving the investment, or whether the state receiving the investment must act with 
due diligence, depending on the circumstances in individual cases.
The first question –about the relation of the FPSS to other standards, and the third ques-
tion –about the types of state liability in arbitration practice have been principally solved and 
raise no significant controversies. The key and still unresolved question, around which the ar-
bitration practice is still dissenting, is the question about the content of the standard – wheth-
er the standard refers only to physical protection and security or whether it also includes a 
more comprehensive legal protection and regulatory protection, security and stability. This 
paper deals primarily with the analysis of the opinions of arbitration practice regarding these 
1  Scheuer, C., Full Protection and Security, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 1.
2  For more details v.: Junngam, N., The Full Protection and Security Standard in International Investment Law: What and Who Is 
Investment Fully Protected and Secured From, American University Business Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2018, p. 4. 
3  Lorz, R. A., Protection and Security, in: Bungenberg, Griebel, Hobe and Reinisch (ed.), International Investment Law, C.H. Beck, 
Hart, Nomos, Baden-Baden, Munchen and Oxford, 2015, p. 764.
4  Sicard-Mirabal, J.; Derains, Y., Introduction to Investor-State Arbitration, Kluwer Law International Alphen aan Rijn, 2018, p. 147.
5  Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Award, para. 124, https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1076.pdf. Accessed on 10 November 2018.
6  Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award from 31. 10. 2012, para. 535. 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf. Accessed on 11 November 2018.
7  Junngam, op. cit. in note 2, p. 5. 
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three questions and with the implications such practice has on the implementation of the 
standards. Special emphasis is put precisely on the questions about the content of the stand-
ards and on the development of arbitration practice in the direction of expanding the stand-
ards’ contents, as well as on legal protection of investments and investors.
2.  GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE STANDARD
This standard has evolved from international customary law, i.e. from a general understand-
ing that every state has the duty to protect the physical integrity and property of foreigners on 
its territory.8 Friendship, trade and navigation treaties signed by the USA in the 19th century 
contained this standard9, and the USA has significantly contributed to the development and 
acceptance of this standard by other countries in their bilateral investment contracts.10 The FPSS 
was thus also incorporated in the first bilateral investment contract between Germany and Paki-
stan: “Investments by nationals or companies of either Party shall enjoy protection and security 
in the territory of the other Party.”11 Since then, clauses guaranteeing the investors full protec-
tion and security have been incorporated into almost all international investment treaties.12 The 
FPSS is ever more frequently used by investors as one of the grounds for seeking protection in 
arbitration proceedings, so that the first arbitration based on international investment treaties 
(AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Adjudication from 1990) was resolved precisely through the implementation 
of this standard.13 It is worth noting that although the use of the FPSS is constantly growing, it is 
still used far less frequently than the standard of fair and equitable treatment and prohibition of 
expropriation. Even when the FPSS is applied together with other standards, the decisions are, 
as a rule, based not on the FPSS but on these other standards.
Formulations used to define the FPSS in international investment treaties vary14 from “full 
protection and security”,15 “complete and full protection and security,16 “highest possible con-
8  For more details about the history of the development of this standard v.: Junngam, op. cit. in note 2, pp. 7–29.
9  Collins, D., Applying the Full Protection and Security Standard of Investment International Law to Digital Assets, Journal of World 
Investment and Trade, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2011, p. 228.
10  W. J., The Law of Investment Treaties, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 231.
11  Art. 3 of the Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between Germany and Pakistan from 1959, https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20457/volume-457-I-6575-English.pdf. Accessed on 11 October 2018.
12  Zeitler, H. E., Full Protection and Security, in: Stephan W. Schill (ed.), International Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2010, p. 183.
13  For more details v.: Alexandrov, A. S., The Evolution of the Full Protection and Security Standard in: Meg Krinear et al. (ed.), 
Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID, Alphan aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2015, p. 319.
14  Here, the author gave examples of investment treaties signed by the Republic of Croatia, based on the Croatian versions of these 
treaties. A comprehensive review of various formulations in the English language is offered, for example, by Junngam, op. cit. in 
note 2, pp. 24–25.
15  Art. 3(1) Ugovora između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Belgijsko-luksemburške ekonomske unije o uzajamnom poticanju i zaštiti 
ulaganja [Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion 
and Protection of Investments] from 31 October 2001, Official Gazette, International Part, No. 5/2002.
16  Art. 5(1) Ugovora između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Vlade Francuske Republike o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ulaganja [Treaty 
between the Government of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of France on the Stimulation and Mutual Protection of 
Investments] from 3 June 1996, Official Gazette, International Part, No. 1/1997.
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stant protection and security”,17 “full protection and full security”,18 “full physical protection 
and security”,19 “full and unconditional legal protection”,20 “full legal protection”,21 to simply 
“protection”.22 However, these variations in linguistic expressions generally have no effect on 
the contents of the standard23 since in interpreting the content of the FPSS the prevailing 
arbitration practice pays little attention to different linguistic formulations in particular in-
vestment contracts, i.e., “the formulation of the contract is not decisive for the scope of im-
plementation of the FPSS”.24 These linguistic variations are inessential and “have no effect on 
their (arbitration tribunals’ A/N) interpretation and implementation of the regulations about 
FPSS”.25 As the Arbitration Tribunal has established in Parkerings vs Lithuania, “it has been 
generally accepted that linguistic variations have no major effect on the level of protection the 
host state must provide”.26 In AAPL v. Sri Lanka the Arbitration Tribunal expressed a similar 
opinion, having concluded that the presence or absence of adjectives such as “full” or “con-
stant” have no effect on the contents and on the level of protection provided by the FPSS.27 
However, there are also examples of different arbitration practice with decisions in which the 
content of the FPSS is directly connected with the wording referring to this standard in the in-
vestment agreement. For example, in Azurix vs Argentina, the point of view of the Arbitration 
Tribunal in interpreting the contents of this standard was that “(…) when the terms “protec-
tion and security” are qualified by “full” and no other adjective or explanation, they extend, in 
their ordinary meaning, the content of this standard beyond physical security”.28 This means 
that the content of this standard is directly connected with its wording. A similar decision 
was passed by the Arbitration Tribunal in Biwater vs Tanzania: “when the terms “protection” 
17  Art. 10(1) Ugovora o energetskoj povelji [The Energy Charter Treaty], from 17 December 1994, Official Gazette, International 
Part, No. 15/1997.
18  Art. 4(1) Ugovora između Republike Hrvatske i Savezne Republike Njemačke o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ulaganja, [Treaty 
between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Stimulation and Mutual Protection of Investments] 
from 21 March 1998, Official Gazette, International Part, 12/1998. 
19  Art. 3(1) Ugovora o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ulaganja između Republike Hrvatske i Kraljevine Nizozemske, [Agreement on 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Republic of Croatia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands] 
drawn up in Zagreb on 28 April 1998, Official Gazette, International Part, 10/1998.
20  Art. 2(2) Sporazuma između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Vlade Ruske Federacije o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ulaganja 
[Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], 20 May 1996, Official Gazette, International Part, No. 13/1996.
21  Art. 3(2) Ugovora o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ulaganja između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Vlade Argentinske Republike 
[Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], 2 December 1994, Official Gazette, International Part, No. 4/1996.
22  Art. 3(1) Ugovora između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Vlade Narodne Republike Kine o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ulaganja 
[Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of People’s Republic of China Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], 7 June 1993, Official Gazette, International Part, No. 2/1994.
23  Alexandrov, op. cit. in note 13, p. 319.
24  Cordero Moss, G., Full Protection and Security, in: August Reinisch (ed.) Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 135.
25  Junngam, op. cit. in note 2, p. 57.
26  Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, para. 354. https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0619.pdf. Accessed on 16 November 2018.
27  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. the Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, para. 50. https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1034.pdf. Accessed on 5 October 2018.
28  Azurix Corp. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para. 408. https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0061.pdf. Accessed on 6 October 2018.
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and “security” are qualified by “full”, the content of the standard may extend to matters other 
than physical security. It implies a State’s guarantee of stability in a secure environment, both 
physical, commercial and legal”.29 
Despite the prevailing arbitration Tribunals’ practice, there is the question of regularity of 
the procedure in which variations in the wording of the standard do not affect its contents, 
especially regarding the principles of the interpretation of international treaties, and in that 
framework, regarding specific reference to previous practice in defining the content of the 
standard, i.e. the reference to previous arbitration awards by which the FPSS has been de-
fined. Such an approach would perhaps even be justifiable if the FPSS were not treated as an 
individual standard but as a mere reflection of international customary law. Otherwise, if it is 
an independent standard – and this is the prevailing opinion in practice and theory of interna-
tional investment law – such practice cannot be justified, since arbitration tribunals pass their 
decisions based on how other arbitration courts have interpreted an independent standard of 
protection in another, unrelated treaty. 
According to this standard, objects of protection may be investors and/or investments. 
Some arbitration courts expressed a different opinion according to which only investments, 
and not investors can be objects of protection; “measures that affect an investor personally 
with no concomitant effect on the investment do not amount to a breach of that standard 
of protection (FPSS N/A)”.30 Still, the prevailing arbitration practice has taken the position 
that the protection also includes the investor, i.e. that the clause about the protection of 
investment implicitly protects the investor,31 as stated by the Arbitration Tribunal in AWG 
v. Argentina “the FPSS obliges Argentina to exercise due diligence to protect investors and 
investments”.32
One of the questions raised if the investor should be included as object of protection is the 
question of compensation for physical attack on the investor. The question is, namely, what 
kind of damage such an attack would constitute. If the investor could prove that he had suf-
fered economic damage because of the attack, there should be no problems in awarding him 
due compensation. It is questionable however, if compensation could be awarded for moral 
damage that the investor would, as a rule, suffer because of the physical attack.  The available 
arbitration practice offers no examples of such compensation being requested, although the 
position of the Arbitration Tribunal in Rompetrol v. Romania could be taken as a guideline. This 
tribunal expressed the following view: “’moral damages’ cannot be admitted as a proxy for the 
inability (of the claimant N/A) to prove actual economic damage”.33 Hence, the investor would 
have no right for compensation for moral damage suffered as the consequence of a physical 
attack if he could not also prove the actual economic damage he had suffered.
29  Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 Award, para. 729. https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf. Accessed on November 2018.
30  Hesham T. M. Al Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Award, para. 629. https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4164.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018.
31  Junngam, op. cit. in note 2, p. 59. 
32 A WG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Conclusion about Responsibility, para. 179. https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0055.pdf. Accessed on 21 November 2018.
33  The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, para. 293, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw1408.pdf. Accessed on 28 April 2019.
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3.   RELATION BETWEEN THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY 
STANDARD AND OTHER INVESTMENT AND INVESTOR 
PROTECTION STANDARDS 
3.1.   DISTINGUISHING THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD (FPSS) 
FROM THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD (FETS)
These two standards can be regarded as separate standards, but they overlap in many 
respects. Overlapping of these two standards could be explained by the fact that they both 
originate from the same norm of international customary law, but in the course of time, dif-
ferent practice has developed in the implementation of these two standards.34 Thus the FPSS 
obliges the states receiving investments to act with due diligence, in the amount that can be 
reasonably expected, in order to protect foreign investments and investors, at the same time 
putting at their disposal the adequate legal system for their protection. 35 The FETS,36 on the 
other hand, is the standard the aim of which is to “fill the gaps that may have been left by 
other, more concrete standards (including the FPSS N/A) to realize the protection of investors 
envisaged by the treaties”.37 The FETS is consisted mainly of the obligation of the recipient 
country to refrain from certain forms of actions that could prove detrimental for the investor 
or the investment, whereas the FPSS represents the obligation of the host state to actively 
work on the creation of an environment that guarantees security of the investor and of the 
investment. As Scheuer says, it seems to be more justified to regard these two as different 
standards, since it seems rather unconvincing that these two standards, which are separately 
stated in the treaties, should have the same meaning.38 This view was also confirmed by the 
Arbitration Tribunal in Jan de Nul v. Egypt when it concluded that “the notion of continuous 
protection and security is to be distinguished here from the fair and equitable standard since 
they are placed in two different provisions of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT), even if the 
two guarantees can overlap”.39
Arbitration practice has prevailingly assumed the position that these are two distinct 
standards that do not overlap40 and thus the “fact that the Tribunal rejected the FET claim 
34  For more details v.: Foster, K., G., Recovering Protection and Security: The Treaty Standard’s Obscure Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and 
Key Current Significance, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2012, p. 1137.
35  Ibid., p. 1103.
36  The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard is “today the most frequently invoked standard in investment disputes. It is also 
the standard with the highest practical relevance since the majority of successful claims pursued in international arbitration are 
based on a violation of this standard...” (Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C., Principles of International Law, 2nd Ed, Oxford University Press, 
2012, p. 130).
37  Ibid., p. 132.
38  Scheuer, op. cit. in note 1, p. 13.
39  Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, para. 269, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0440.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018.
40  Azurix v. Argentine, op. cit. in note 28, para. 407. 
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does not imply the rejection of the claim for a violation of protection and security”.41 In Elec-
trabel v. Hungary, the Arbitration Tribunal established that, since in the Energy Charter Trea-
ty42 the FPS and the FET are referred to as two separate standards they must have, by appli-
cation of the legal principle of “effet utile”,43 a different scope and role”.44 A similar opinion 
was expressed by the Arbitration Tribunal in Frontier v. The Czech Republic: “full protection and 
security obliges the host state to provide a legal framework that grants security and protects 
the investment against adverse action by private persons as well as state organs, whereas fair 
and equitable treatment consists mainly of an obligation on the part of the host state to desist 
from behaviour that is unfair and inequitable”.45 The Arbitration Tribunal in AES v. Kazakh-
stan also took the position that the FPS and the FET are two separate standards; however, the 
differences between them depend on the circumstances in each individual case: “In particu-
lar, Claimants have not demonstrated that such a claim, which is based ‘on adverse effects of 
regulatory measure or administrative actions on the investment’, is actually different from 
the claim raised under the FET standard and the obligation to refrain from unreasonable and 
arbitrary impairment.”46 
Very interesting is the opinion of the Arbitration Tribunal in Oxus v. Uzbekistan according 
to which the decisive element for differentiation of these two standards is whether the pro-
tection in question is against the activities of the state and its bodies or the activities of third 
persons. “The FPS standard complements the FET standard by providing protection towards 
acts of third parties, i.e. non-state parties, which are not covered by the FET standard. Thus, 
where an incriminated act is done by a State organ, the applicable standard is the FET stand-
ard, whereas where such an act is done by a non-state entity, the applicable standard becomes 
the FPS standard.”47 Thus, according to the FPS standard, the investor cannot expect the state 
to secure his fair and equitable treatment by third persons, but he has the right to expect the 
state to undertake all reasonable measures to prevent any injuries that may come from third 
persons, and in case injuries are inflicted, to punish the perpetrators. 
In AWG v. Argentina, the Arbitration Tribunal took the position that an excessively broad 
interpretation of the FPS standard may result in overlapping with other protection standards, 
so that the extension of this standard beyond physical protection would make it overlap with 
the FET standard.48 In Plama v. Bulgaria, the Arbitration Tribunal also determined that this 
41  Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24.
  Award, para 820, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4228.pdf. 16 October 2018.
42  For more information on protection standards according to the Energy Charter Treaty v.: Miljenić, O., Energy Charter Treaty – 
Standards of Investment Protection, Croatian International Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 83, 2012, pp. 52–83.
43  Principle of interpretation of the contract assuming that each provision of the contract has a specific meaning and serves to the 
realization of a specific goal. (Gazzini, T., Interpretation of International Investment Treaties, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016, p. 
170).
44  Electrabel S. A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 Award of jurisdiction and applicable law, para. 7.83, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4495.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018. 
45  Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, para. 296. https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0342.pdf. Accessed on 17 November 2018.
46  AES Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/16, Award, para. 339. https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8205-0.pdf. Accessed on 15 November 2018.
47  Oxus Gold v. Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, Award, para. 353. https://www.italaw.com/sites/ default/files/case-documents/
italaw7238-2.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018.
48  AWG Group v. Argentine, op. cit. in note 32, para. 174.
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FPS relates primarily to physical protection, but that the practice frequently interpreted it 
as also including legal security, which brings it very close to the FET standard.49 The Arbitra-
tion Tribunal in Spyridon v. Romania concluded that the FPS standard is “covered” by the FET 
standard in cases where protection is interpreted as extending beyond the protection against 
physical attacks.50 
Some arbitration tribunals equated the contents of these two standards. So, for exam-
ple, in Occidental v. Ecuador, the Arbitration Tribunal, having established the fact that the Re-
spondent had violated the FET standard, found that in the given context “the question of 
whether in addition there has been a breach of full protection and security under this Article 
becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically entails an absence 
of full protection and security of the investment”.51 Similarly, in Rusoro v. Venezuela, the Arbi-
tration Tribunal equated these two standards by establishing that a violation of the investor’s 
rights that does not constitute a violation of the FET standard “can never imply a breach of the 
FPS standard, however widely interpreted”.52 
3.2.   RELATION TOWARDS THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF PROTECTION AS 
REGULATED BY INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
The minimum standard of protection derives from the principle of the international cus-
tomary law according to which the state must secure at least such a level of protection for 
foreigners and their property on that state’s territory, “that would be sufficient to satisfy the 
minimum of international standards prescribed by international law, and it must guarantee 
for them, at least when the security of goods and persons is in question, equality with its own 
citizens before the law”.53 As it was defined in the OECD study, “the international minimum 
standard is a norm of customary international law which governs the treatment of aliens, by 
providing for a minimum set of principles which States, regardless of their domestic legisla-
tion and practices, must respect when dealing with foreign nationals and their property. (…) 
the international minimum standard sets a number of basic rights established by internation-
al law that States must grant to aliens, independent of the treatment accorded to their own cit-
izens”.54 In the ELSI case, the International Court confirmed that the contractual standard of 
protection must comply with the international minimum standard, but that parties can also 
49  Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, para.180. https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0671.pdf. Accessed on 15 November 2018.
50  Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, para. 321. https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0723.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018.
51  Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, para. 187, https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0571.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018.
52  Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5. Award, para. 548, https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7507.pdf. Accessed on 22 November 2018.
53  Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Jennings &Watts eds., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 910. For more details 
about international minimum standard v. e.g. in: Paparinskis, M., The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013.
54  OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2004/03: Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment 
Law, OECD Publishing 2004, pp. 8 and 9. 
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agree upon greater protection than that provided by the international minimum standard,55 
whereas in the Noble Ventures case, the Arbitration Tribunal established that “it seems doubt-
ful whether that provision (that the investment shall enjoy full protection and security N/A) 
can be understood as being wider in scope than the general duty to provide for protection and 
security of foreign nationals found in the customary international law of aliens”.56 
There is, of course, the question of whether the FPS standard from investment treaties has 
the same content as the standard of protection in international customary law. Scheuer sug-
gests that the FPS is an autonomous standard that is independent of the international mini-
mum standard. As his main point, Scheuer points out that it would be very hard to understand 
why negotiators of investment treaties would use the term “full protection and security” if, in 
fact, they had in mind the “minimum” standard according to international customary law”.57 
Unlike Scheuer, some authors took the position that the standards of protection are the same 
in both cases and that the FPS standard is “an element or the other name for international 
minimum standard”.58
The literature and arbitration practice have developed two possible approaches to the rela-
tion between these two standards:59
1. The minimum standard represents the lower limit of a state’s obligations if the invest-
ment treaty contains the FPS standard clause. This is, for example, how the Arbitration Tri-
bunal approached the case Azurix v. Argentina; the Tribunal found that the expression “not 
less than required by international law” in the investment treaty should be interpreted in the 
manner that the FPS is a higher standard than that of the international law, since the purpose 
of such a clause is to set the “floor” and not the “ceiling” to avoid possible interpretation of 
these standards under the level required by the international law”.60 
2. The minimum standard and the FPS standard provides the same level of protection. This 
approach is applied in arbitration procedures conducted on the basis of NAFTA (North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement) on grounds of the Interpretative Declaration on Art. 1105(1) 
following which the minimum standard according to international customary law represents 
the minimum standard of protection of investors and investments under NAFTA, and the 
FPS standard “does not require the treatment that would be added or that would exceed the 
requirements of the minimum standard of international customary law in the treatment 
of aliens”.61 An example of this approach is the case Noble Ventures v. Romania in which, in 
the course of interpretation of the content of the FPS standard, it was established that “it is 
doubtful whether that provision can be understood as being wider in scope than the general 
55  International Court, Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Award from 20 July 1989, para. 111, 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/76/076-19890720-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. Accessed on 24 October 2018. 
56  Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 164, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0565.pdf. Accessed on 22 October 2018. 
57  Scheuer, op. cit. in note 1, p. 12.
58  Foster, op. cit. in note 34, p. 1113.
59  Some authors, such as for example Cordero Moss (op. cit. in note 24, pp. 136-137) also add a third approach according to which 
the international minimum standard would represent the “upper” limit of obligation.
60  Azurix v. Argentine, Award, op. cit. in note 28, para. 361.
61  North American Free Trade Agreement, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 
July 31, 2001, http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding-e.asp. Accessed on 22 November 2018.
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duty to provide for protection and security of foreign nationals found in the customary inter-
national law of aliens”.62 Similar is the case of El Paso v. Argentina where the Arbitration Tribu-
nal took the position that the FPS is not an independent standard that would set up a higher 
standard of protection than that envisaged by the international minimum standard, “it is no 
more than the traditional obligation to protect aliens under international customary law”.63 
De Brabandere, on the other hand, says that in the cases when the FPS standard relates only 
to the protection against violence coming from third persons, this standard overlaps with the 
international minimum standard.64 
The most convincing point of view about the FPS is that following which the FPS is a dif-
ferent and independent standard of protection the content of which cannot be identified with 
the content of the international minimum standard,65 but the minimum standard can rep-
resent the lower limit of obligations that the state has in providing protection and security 
for investors, unless, of course, it has not been otherwise agreed in the relevant investment 
treaty.66 This standpoint was also taken by Salacuse, who says that this standard imposes an 
objective obligation that must not be lesser than that required by the minimum standard of 
diligence and care under international law”.67 
4.  RESPONSIBILITY STANDARD 
4.1.  RESPONSIBILITY STANDARD IN GENERAL
There is the question of responsibility of the state for the violation of the FPS standard, 
i.e. the question of what kind of action or omission by the state is required in order that the 
state answers for the violation of this standard. Two situations must be distinguished here: 
that when the violation is committed by the states’ bodies or by persons for which the state 
answers under international law and that when third persons commit the violation. Namely, 
the FPS standard also refers to situations in which the state would inflict damage on the inves-
tor either directly, or through one of its bodies, and situations in which the damage was caused 
by a third, private person. Thus the Arbitration Tribunal in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania did not 
consider that “the “full security” standard is limited to a State’s failure to prevent actions by 
third parties, but also extends to actions by organs and representatives of the State itself”.68 
In providing this standard, the protection against the actions of state bodies is absolute and 
62  Noble Ventures v. Romania, op. cit. note 56, para. 164.
63  Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, para. 522, https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf. Accessed on 22 November 2018.
64  De Brabandere, E., Host States’ Due Diligence Obligations in International Investment Law, Syracuse Journal of International Law 
and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2015, p. 331.
65  Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2
  Award, para. 632, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7194.pdf. Accessed on 15 November 2018.
66  For more details v.: Lorz, op. cit. in note 3, p. 773.
67  Salacuse, op. cit. note 10, p. 240.
68  Biwater v.Tanzania, op. cit. in note 29, para. 730. 
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the state is always answerable69, i.e., there is one type of responsibility, whereas in the ac-
countability of the state for actions of third parties, the standard of the state’s “due diligence” 
is applied. When third persons are involved, the state answers under the principle of due dili-
gence. As Dolzer and Scheuer put it, “whenever state bodies act in a manner that violates this 
standard or significantly contributes to such violation, the questions of attribution or due 
diligence are not raised because in these cases the state shall be directly responsible”.70 Hence, 
when it comes to acts of state or its bodies, the state always answers (provided, of course, that 
two main conditions are satisfied – that the action can be attributed to the state and that the 
act is contrary to international law) so that in these cases the application of the standard of 
due diligence is out of the question. The state receiving the investment must secure that its 
bodies and other subjects for which it is responsible will refrain from violations of this stand-
ard. When it comes to actions of third persons, the host state must act with due diligence to 
prevent violations and if they do happen, then it must also with due diligence investigate and 
punish the perpetrators.71 Investment arbitration practice has taken the position that the due 
diligence standard is not applied when physical protection and security of the investor or his 
investment is threatened by the state receiving the investment or by a body for which it is 
responsible.72 Regarding the protection against private persons, arbitration practice has de-
veloped in the way that the state “only has the duty to apply due diligence in the protection of 
the investors against violent interference”.73 Objective responsibility of the state for actions of 
its bodies is characterised by the point of view such as that of the Arbitration Tribunal in AMT 
v. Zaire: the Tribunal ascertained that the responsibility of the state irrefutably arises from 
the very fact that “Zaire omitted to undertake all necessary measures to protect and secure 
the safety of investment (…).”74 The due diligence standard, on the other hand, was defined in 
the award in the case of AAPL v. Sri Lanka as: “nothing less or more than reasonable measures 
of prevention that could be expected to be taken by a well organized authority under similar 
circumstances. According to modern doctrine, the violation of international law that includes 
the responsibility of the state should be considered as established already due to lack or non-
existence of due diligence, without the need to determine the existence of intention or negli-
gence.”75 This point of view that the FPS standard binds the state a) to undertake whatever is 
reasonable under the given circumstances and b) to act on that occasion with due diligence, 
represents the basic settings that have not changed in the course of implementation of this 
standard in  arbitration practice.76 In Paushok v. Mongolia, the Arbitration Tribunal defined 
that “states must act with due diligence to prevent unlawful injuries to persons or property of 
69  International Law Commision, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Art 4 with 
comments. http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9-6-2001.pdf. Accessed on 5 October 2108. 
70  Dolzer, et. al. op. cit. in note 36, p. 162.
71  Zeitler, op. cit. in note 12, p. 191.
72  De Brabandere, op. cit. in note 64, p. 337.
73  For more details v.: Scheuer, op. cit. in note 1, p. 17.
74  American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, para. 6.11, https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0028.pdf. Accessed on 25 October 2018.
75  AAPL v. Sri Lanka, op. cit. in note 27, para. 77.
76  Alexandrov, op. cit. in note 13, p. 321.
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aliens on their territories, and that in case they fail to do so, they must act at least with due 
diligence in the punishment for such injuries”.77
4.2.  DUE DILIGENCE
There is a general consensus on the obligation of the state receiving an investment to act 
with due diligence when implementing the FPS standard, i.e. it must apply “such measures in 
protecting foreign investments that are reasonable under the given circumstances”78. The host 
state has the duty to “adopt all reasonable measures in order to protect the property or own-
ership against threats or attacks that may specifically relate to aliens or particular groups of 
aliens”.79 In Noble Ventures v. Romania, the Arbitration Tribunal explicitly stated that “(…) the 
general duty to provide protection and security for foreign nationals (…) is not a strict stand-
ard (what is meant here is the objective responsibility standard, N/A) but a standard requiring 
the state to act with due diligence”.80 The Arbitration Tribunal in Siag v. Egypt also found that 
the FPS standard is not absolute and that the state receiving the investment must act with due 
diligence in preventing investment damage.81 When it comes to the content of “due diligence” 
with which recipient states must act, many arbitration tribunals have referred to Freeman’s 
definition, according to which “due diligence is nothing more nor less than the reasonable 
measures of prevention that can be expected from a well-managed government under similar 
circumstances”.82 Some arbitration tribunals, such as the Tribunal in AMT v. Zaire, also added 
that this objective comparator, i.e., a well-managed government, must not be inferior to the 
minimum treatment standard under international law.83
Of course, here the question arises as to how to estimate what is reasonable, i.e., what 
to compare the state’s actions to in order to establish whether it was reasonable and hence 
justified. As stated earlier, the FPS standard belongs to the so-called absolute, i.e., objective 
investor protection standards, in which the treatment of the investor is not compared to the 
treatment of another investor but to the treatment required by international law, i.e., to how 
investors and their investments should be treated under international law. In DeBrabandere’s 
opinion, this comparator is exactly the standard of due diligence or the acting of a diligent 
state.84 With regard to this position, i.e., to the taking of a well-organized government as com-
parator, it could be concluded, as stated by Salacuse, that the position of the state, i.e., the lack 
77  Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award 
on jurisdiction and responsibility, 324, https://www.italaw.comsites/ default/files/case-documents/ita0622.pdf. Accessed on 15 
November 2018.
78  Dolzer, et. al. op. cit. in note 36, p. 161.
79  Saluka Investment BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, para. 484, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0740.pdf. Accessed on 22 October 2018.
80  Noble Ventures v. Romania, op. cit. in note 56, para. 164. 
81  Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, para. 447, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0786-0.pdf. Accessed on 17 November 2018. 
82  AWG v. Argentine, op. cit. in note 32, para. 163.
83  AMT. v. Zaire, op. cit. in note 74, para. 6.06.
84  De Brabandere, op. cit. in note 64, p. 329.
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of assets or the presence of a crisis, could not serve as an excuse for the state to disregard its 
obligations under the FPS standard.85 Newcombe and Paradell advocate the opposite opinion 
that arbitration tribunals are likely in their practice to take into account “the level of develop-
ment and stability as relevant circumstances in determining whether the state acted with due 
diligence. The investor investing in a region with endemic civil strife and poor public adminis-
tration cannot have the same expectations regarding his physical security as the one investing 
in London, New York or Tokyo”.86 
Like the legal theory, arbitration practice about this also varies. So, on the one hand, most 
of the arbitration practice holds that the FPS standard prescribes a uniform standard of dili-
gence, regardless of the conditions in a particular state. This opinion was followed in the award 
in AAPL v. Sri Lanka, in which the Arbitration Tribunal set up the standard of “reasonably well 
organized modern State”87 or, as the Arbitration Tribunal found in Al Warraq v. Indonesia, the 
recipient state has no obligation to provide a higher level of protection than that which “a well 
administered government could be reasonably expected to exercise in similar circumstanc-
es”.88 Similar was also the finding of the Arbitration Tribunal in Glamis v. The United States of 
America: “It (the FPS standard, A/N) is meant to serve as a floor, an absolute bottom, below 
which conduct is not accepted by the international community. Although the circumstances 
of the case are of course relevant, the standard is not meant to vary from state to state or 
investor to investor”.89
According to another approach, the FPS standard “must not be strictly objectified and ap-
plicable throughout the world; instead, its content must rather vary depending on the situ-
ation in the respective state”90- it must take into account the development and stability of a 
particular state.91 Thus, the Arbitration Tribunal in Pantechniki v. Albania also concluded that 
the question of whether the state has acted with due diligence must be considered with regard 
to the conditions in the recipient country and therefore due diligence may differ in differ-
ent states depending on their level of development and options they have at their disposal. 
The comparator is, therefore, not an abstract well-organized government, but a state with the 
same conditions as those in the state receiving the investment.92 Nevertheless, it must be em-
phasized that even in such an assessment, there are certain minimum standards under which 
no state is allowed to go.93
85  Salacuse, op. cit. in note 10, p. 240.
86  Newcombe, A.; Paradell, L., Law and Practice of Investment Treaties, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 310.
87  AAPL v. the Sri Lanka, op. cit. in note 27, para. 77. 
88  Al Warraq v. Indonesia, op. cit. in note 30, para. 625.
89  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, para. 615, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0378.pdf. Accessed on 22 November 2018.
90  Zeitler, op. cit. in note12, p. 201.
91  Lorz, op. cit. in note 3, p.780.
92  Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21 Award, para. 81, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0618.pdf. Accessed on 22 November 2018. 
93  Ibid. para. 79.
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The responsibility for violations of the FPS standard by the state receiving the investment 
should be proportional to its resources.94 It should be emphasized that the obligation to show 
“due diligence” does not mean that the State has to prevent any injury whatsoever. Rather, the 
obligation is generally understood as requiring that the State takes reasonable actions within 
its power “to avoid injury when it is, or should be, aware that there is a risk of injury. The pre-
cise degree of care, of what is “reasonable” or “due”, depends in part on the circumstances”.95 
Very interesting was the approach of the Arbitration Tribunal in Mamidoil v. Albania; in 
determining the existence of a violation of the FPS standard, the Tribunal assessed not only 
the actions of the state but also the actions of the investor. According to the findings of the 
Arbitration Tribunal, the constant protection and security standard obliges States to use due 
diligence to prevent harassment and injuries to investors. The assessment of whether the state 
had acted with due diligence is conditioned by the circumstances in which it had acted.96 On the 
one hand, it is important to determine what the state has done or objectively could have done, 
and on the other hand it is also important how the investor acted; i.e., if he acted with due 
diligence in assessing all the circumstances and security conditions prior to his investment.97
In arbitration practice, several elements have developed that would constitute the con-
tent of due diligence:98 a) justification of the actions of the recipient state, as defined by the 
Arbitration Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexsico: “the acting of the state was in accordance with the 
parameters inherent in a democratic state”;99 b) the state should have been informed about 
the situation or be aware of the risks, as defined by the Arbitration Tribunal in Wena Hotels v. 
Egypt: “Egypt was aware of the intentions to take over the hotels and took no actions to pre-
vent the seizures or to immediately restore Wena’s control over the hotels”100 and c) the case 
where the state acts in bad faith or refuses to implement the necessary measures despite of its 
awareness of the situation cannot be regarded as acting with due diligence. 
4.3.  RESPECT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE HOST COUNTRY
Another question that arises in determining whether the host state acted with due dili-
gence is the question of the “state’s sovereignty”, i.e., to what extent can arbitration tribu-
nals assess a particular state with respect to the measures that need to be taken to prevent 
a violation of the FPS standard. According to Cordero Moss, arbitration practice has set a 
very high threshold in determining the existence of a state’s responsibility for the violation 
of this standard. As a rule, arbitration tribunals accept all measures undertaken by the state 
94  Ibid. para.77.
95  Paushok, v. Mongolia, op. cit. in note 77, para. 325. 
96  Mamidoil v. Albania, op. cit. in note 41, para. 821. 
97  Ibid. para. 828.
98  De Brabandere, op. cit. in note 64, p. 352.
99  Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0854.pdf. Accessed on 18 November 2018. 
100  Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, para. 85, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0902.pdf. Accessed on 5 November 2018.
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as sufficient, and the state’s responsibility merits consideration only in the case where the 
state has failed to take any measures to prevent the violation, remedy its effects or punish the 
wrongdoers.101 The issue in question here is the obligation to “act”, and not the obligation to 
“provide results”, which means that the state has fulfilled its obligation if it acted with due dil-
igence, even if its acting yielded no results.102 As stated by the Arbitration Tribunal in Tecmed 
v. Mexico, the FPS standard is not a standard that would establish absolute responsibility of 
the state that adopts it in its investment treaty.103 According to Zeitler, general principles of 
law support the approach under which in the assessment of a state’s actions, its sovereignty 
must be respected and that therefore in the assessment of the applied measures it must also 
be accepted that every state is in the position to best estimate when and how to intervene.104
As a rule, the host state is expected to monitor the situation and to act in accordance 
with available information about possible threats to the security of the investor or his invest-
ment. Thus, in MNSS v. Montenegro, the Arbitration Tribunal found that the FPS standard 
requires the state receiving the investment to act proactively in order to secure the protection 
of persons and property, especially when it was previously warned about the possibility of 
violation.105 This standard does not establish absolute liability of the state receiving the invest-
ment, but merely the obligation of “vigilance and due diligence taking into account the circum-
stances and resources of the host State”.106 Thus also in Tulip Estate v. Turkey, the Arbitration 
Tribunal found that the FPS standard does not immediately establish absolute liability of the 
State, since the State cannot “secure or guarantee full protection and security of the invest-
ment”. Therefore, in determining a violation of this standard, the relevant issues are the “facts 
and degree, responsive to the circumstances of the particular case”. 107 The FPS standard does 
not establish absolute liability of the state108 but the obligation of the state to act with due dil-
igence109 in actively developing a “framework that guarantees security”.110 In Toto Costruzioni 
v. Lebanon, the Arbitration Tribunal defined the FPS as the standard seeking to prohibit the 
state to act negligently in its implementation.111 Under the FPS standard, the obligation of the 
host State does not attract strict liability but imposes a lesser duty more akin to the exercise 
of due diligence. Both standards can require active, and not merely passive, conduct by the 
host State that may go beyond the mere abstention from prejudicial conduct”.112 In Electrabel v. 
101  Cordero Moss, op. cit. in note 24, p. 139.
102  Ibid.
103  Tecmed v. Mexico, op. cit. in note 99, para. 177. 
104  For more details v.: Zeitler, op. cit. in note 12, pp. 203–206.
105  MNSS B.V. and Recupero Credito Acciaio N.V. v. Montenegro, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/8, Award, para. 356, https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7311-0.pdf. Accessed on 28 November 2018.
106  Ibid. para. 351.
107  Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, para. 430, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3126.pdf. Accessed on 20 November 2018. 
108  Plama v. Bulgaria, op. cit. in note 49, para.180.
109  Ibid. para. 179.
110  Ibid. para. 180.
111  Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, para. 229, https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1013.pdf. Accessed on 6 November 2018.
112  Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award, para. 6.81, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw7443.pdf. Accessed on 7 November 2018.
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Hungary, the Arbitration Tribunal found that “by promising full protection and security, Hun-
gary assumed an obligation actively to create and maintain measures that promote security. 
The necessary measures must be capable of protecting the covered investment against adverse 
action by private persons”.113 The Tribunal did not itself determine the standard of securing 
constant protection and security, but applied the standard from the case El Paso v. Argentina, 
which includes prevention and repression as well as the obligation of the state to act with due 
diligence: “The minimum standard of vigilance and care set by international law comprises a 
duty of prevention and a duty of repression. An important aspect of the international stand-
ard of treatment is that States must use “due diligence” to prevent wrongful injuries to the 
person or property of aliens caused by third parties within their territory, and, if they did not 
succeed, exercise at least “due diligence” to punish such injuries. If a State fails to exercise due 
diligence to prevent or punish such injuries, it is responsible for this omission and is liable 
for the ensuing damage.  It should be emphasised that the obligation to show “due diligence” 
does not mean that the State has to prevent each and every injury. This obligation is generally 
understood as the requirement that the State should take reasonable actions within its power 
to avoid injury when it is, or should be, aware that there is a risk of injury. The precise degree 
of care and of what is “reasonable” or “due,” depends on the circumstances”.114
The requirement that the state should act with due diligence relates to the state’s obliga-
tion to prevent and penalize violations of the FPS standard, so that the recipient states must 
use “due diligence” to prevent wrongful injuries to the investor and/or investment and, if 
they did not succeed, they must exercise at least “due diligence” to find and punish the wrong 
doers. Here, it must be pointed out that this obligation does not require the recipient state to 
prevent each and every injury; the FPS standard does not give the investor “guarantees against 
every risk”.115 In the case Wena Hotels v. Egypt, the Arbitration Tribunal found that Egypt vio-
lated its obligation under the FPS standard since it had information about plans to seize the 
investment of the foreign investor but did nothing to prevent the seizure or to restore the 
previous condition116. In addition to the above, even when the investment was repossessed by 
the investor, it was neither repossessed in the condition in which it was seized, nor was any 
compensation paid to the investor for the inflicted damage.117 Eventually, the final element in 
the liability of Egypt was the fact that none of the perpetrators were punished for the violation 
of the standard; quite contrary, they all advanced in their careers.118 Therefore, in addition to 
the protection, the state receiving the investment must also secure the punishment of the 
perpetrators who attack investors and their investments. Thus, in the case of Suez v. Argentina, 
the Arbitration Tribunal clearly specified that the duty of the state in the implementation of 
the FPS standard includes both physical protection of the investor and punishment of the per-
petrators: “The Full Protection and Security Standard primarily includes the protection of the 
investment against physical damage. However, this standard can also include the obligation to 
113  Electrabel v. Hungary, op. cit. in note 44, para. 7.145.
114  El Paso v. Argentina, op. cit. in note 53, para. 522–523. 
115  Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)04/6 Award, para. 223, https://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1250.pdf. Accessed on 8 November 2018.
116  Wena Hotels v. Egypt, op. cit. in note 100, para. 85.
117  Ibid. para. 92–93.
118  Ibid. para. 94.
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provide adequate mechanisms and legal remedies for prosecuting the state organs or private 
parties responsible for the injury caused to the investor”.119 
5.  CONTENT OF THE STANDARD
5.1.  PHYSICAL PROTECTION
The FPS standard has developed primarily in the context of physical security of persons 
and property120 and it is undisputable that it relates to physical protection and security of in-
vestments,121 i.e., that this standard comprises two fundamental obligations – the protection 
against and prevention of physical attacks on investors and punishment of the perpetrators of 
such attacks.122 As it was found by the Arbitration Tribunal in Suez v. Argentina, the FPS stand-
ard relates primarily to protection against physical damage but may also include the obligation 
to “secure adequate mechanisms and legal remedies for the prosecution of public servants or 
private persons responsible for the damage caused to the investor”.123
The FPS standard is applied when a foreign investment is violated by civil conflicts and 
physical violence124 and it obliges the state to provide the “foreign investment with a certain 
level of protection against physical damage”.125 The Point of view that the FPS standard relates 
exclusively to physical protection of persons and property is “a more traditional and common-
ly adopted view confirmed in numerous cases (…).”126 In the case of Crystallex v. Venezuela, the 
Arbitration Tribunal concluded that the FPS standard relates “only to the duty of the state 
receiving the investment to guarantee physical protection and security”.127 Equally, in Liman 
v. Kazahstan, the Arbitration Tribunal found that the standard of constant protection and se-
curity does not relate to contractual obligations, but merely to “protection of the integrity of 
investment against the use of force and specifically against physical harms”.128 
119  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 
Odluka o odgovornosti, para. 173, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf. Accessed on 10 
November 2018.
120  Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258, https://www.italaw.com/ sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0695.pdf. Accessed 
on 16 November 2018. 
121  Scheuer, op. cit. in note 1, p. 2.
122  For more details v.: Lorz, op. cit. in note 3, pp. 766–768.
123  Suez v. Argentine Republic, op. cit. in note 119. 
124  Saluka v. Czech, op. cit. in note 79, para. 483.
125  Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, 
Award, para. 668, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf. Accessed on 10 November 2018. 
126  Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/09/1, Award, para 622, https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4009.pdf. Accessed on 15 November 2018.
127  Crystallex v. Venezuela, op. cit. in note 65, para.632.
128  Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Award, para. 289, https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw1429.pdf. Accessed on 29 November 2018.
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Some of the examples of physical violence from arbitration practice mentioned by Jun-
ngam are:129 1) civil unrest, civil strife, civil disturbance, and physical violence; 2) threats and 
attacks on investment; 3) physical invasion of business premises or investment sites; 4) rioting 
and looting; 5) attack and seizure of property; 6) impairment affecting the physical integrity 
of investment by forceful interference; 7) wrecking, looting, and dismantlement of equipment 
and property; 8) forceful expropriation of investment; 9) killings and destruction of property; 
and 10) occupation of a building and physical assault of the CEO. Recently, the possibility was 
considered to also apply the FPS standard in referring to physical harm inflicted on the envi-
ronment of the investment, as it was stated by the Arbitration Tribunal in Allard v. Barbados: 
“accepting the Claimant’s articulation of the FPS standard as including an obligation of the 
host State to protect foreign investments against environmental damage”.130
5.2.  LEGAL PROTECTION
There is another aspect of this standard that has developed over time in the practice of 
arbitration tribunals: in addition to physical protection and security, it also provides legal pro-
tection and security. The practice is rather divided regarding the implementation of such an 
approach so that many arbitration tribunals follow the traditional approach and they do not 
agree with the extension of this standard beyond mere physical protection.131 On the other 
hand, a number of arbitration awards speak in favour of extending the standard beyond the 
reach of only physical protection and security. One of the arguments for such an extension of 
the standard may be the fact that modern investment treaties, as a rule, also protect intellec-
tual property rights132 that, logically, cannot be infringed by physical injuries and thus would 
not enjoy protection according to the strict interpretation of the FPS standard. As set out in 
the case Siemens v. Argentina, “As a general matter and based on the definition of investment, 
which includes tangible and intangible assets, the Tribunal considers that the obligation to 
provide full protection and security is wider than “physical” protection and security. It is dif-
ficult to understand how the physical security of an intangible asset would be achieved”.133
In the opinion of some authors, the first decision in which the scope of this standard was 
extended to also include legal protection, i.e. which suggested the existence of an efficient 
legal system for protection of the investor’s rights was the decision of the International Court 
in the ELSI case, because in this decision the Court implicitly accepted that this standard in-
cludes more than just physical protection.134 However, the first award in investment arbitra-
tion that determined that the FPS standard extends beyond physical security was the award in 
129  Junngam, op. cit. in note 2, pp. 61–62.
130  Peter A. Allard v. The Government of Barbados, PCA Case No. 2012-06, Award, para. 252, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw7594.pdf. Accessed on 22 November 2018. 
131  Lorz, op. cit. in note 3, p. 781.
132  E. g. Art. 1(4) (d) Ugovora o Energetskoj povelji [The Energy Charter Treaty], op. cit. in note 17.
133  Siemens A.G. v. the Argentine Republic, ICSID predmet broj ARB/02/8, Award, para. 303, accessible at https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0790.pdf. Accessed on 16 September 2018.
134  Newcombe et. al., op. cit. in note 86.
53
Orsat Miljenić, FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
the case CME v. The Czech Republic, in which the Arbitration Tribunal interpreted this standard 
by concluding that the host state is obligated to ensure that “neither by amendment of its laws 
nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and approved security and protection 
of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or devalued”.135 A similar example is found in 
the award in the case CSOB v. Slovakia, in which the Arbitration Tribunal explicitly determined 
that “The Slovak Republic’s denial of CSOB’s title to request from the Slovak Republic that SI’s 
losses are covered would deprive CSOB from any meaningful protection for its loan and thus 
breach the Slovak Republic’s commitment to let CSOB ‘enjoy full protection and security’.”136 
The case Azurix v. Argentina is important because in it, in a broad and detailed analysis in its 
Award, the Arbitration Tribunal confirmed that the FPS standard can be infringed not only 
through physical violence, but also through destabilization of the legal order: “The cases re-
ferred to above (Occidental v. Ecuador and Wena Hotels v. Egypt, A/N) show that full protection 
and security was understood to go beyond protection and security ensured by the police. It is 
not only a matter of physical security; the stability afforded by a secure investment environ-
ment is as important from an investor’s point of view”.137 Thus also in the case Vivendi v. Argen-
tina, the Arbitration Tribunal found that the FPS standard “can apply to more than physical 
security of an investor or its property, because either could be subject to harassment without 
being physically harmed or seized”.138 
According to interpretations of a number of arbitration tribunals, the FPS also comprises 
the obligation of the state receiving the investment to secure legal protection of the investor 
by allowing him legal action in which the investor can state his claim, and by guaranteeing 
such claim to be analysed under the domestic and international law by an impartial and fair 
tribunal.139 The FPS standard also reaches beyond the limits of protection against physical 
violence and obligates the state also to provide legal protection of the investor.140 In the case 
Siag v. Egypt, the Arbitration Tribunal found that Egypt infringed the FPS standard in two 
ways – firstly, by allowing violent dispossession of the investment to take place and secondly, 
by failing to implement the decisions of Egyptian courts which annulled such dispossession 
and ordered the return of the investment. In their decision, Egyptian courts confirmed that 
the FPS standard also includes the obligation to secure legal mechanisms that guarantee legal 
security of foreign investors.141 So also in the case Frontier v The Czech Republic, the Arbitration 
Tribunal found that the obligation to provide protection and security also includes the obliga-
tion to provide a legal framework that also comprises material legal provisions for protection 
of the investment as well as adequate mechanisms, i.e. procedures at disposal for the investor 
to protect his rights. 142 Concretely, when this relates to court actions, it means that the state 
135  CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 613, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0178.pdf. Accessed on 22 November 2018.
136  Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. Slovak Republic, Award, para. 170, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0146-0.pdf. Accessed on 1 November 2018. 
137  Azurix v. Argentina, op. cit. in note 28, para. 408.
138  Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, para. 
7.4.17, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf. Accessed on 28 October 2018.
139  Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, op. cit. in note 26, para. 360.
140  Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, op. cit. in note 48, para. 321.
141  Siag v. Egypt, op. cit. in note 81, para. 448. 
142  Frontier v. Czech, op. cit. in note 45, para. 263.
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is under an obligation “to make a functioning system of courts and legal remedies available to 
the investor”. However, it does not mean that every “wrong” judicial decision is a violation of 
the standard that would “automatically lead to state responsibility as long as the courts have 
acted in good faith and have reached decisions that are reasonably tenable”.143
In some cases, arbitration tribunals interpreted the FPS standard in such a way that they 
gave it an extremely broad meaning. For example, in Occidental Exploration v. Ecuador, the 
Arbitration Tribunal found that Ecuador violated this standard when it changed the interpre-
tation of the application of value added tax, because by doing so it violated the obligation to 
maintain “the stability of legal and business Environment”, thus violating the SPPT which, 
according to the Tribunal’s conclusion, automatically means a breach of the FPS standard.144 
With this conclusion the Tribunal determined the infringement of the FPS standard without 
determining the existence of a single element of this standard; in the concrete case without 
having determined whether Ecuador made available to the investor an adequate legal system 
that would allow the investor the protection of his rights. Namely, the actions of the state 
must be observed as a whole; the possible unlawful conduct of one of the state bodies does not 
immediately constitute an infraction of the FPS standard if another state body can rectify the 
error.145 Similarly, a very broad explanation was also given by the Arbitration Tribunal in the 
case CME v. The Czech Republic in which the Tribunal found that the Czech Republic infringed 
the FPS standard by changing its media legislation, since the host State is “obligated to ensure 
that neither by amendment of its laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed 
and approved security and protection of the foreign investor’s investment withdrawn or de-
valued”.146 Such a conclusion goes beyond the usual content of this standard, mainly because 
the investor must always expect reasonable amendments of the legal framework introduced in 
good faith and without discrimination.147 In the case National Grid v. Argentina, the Arbitration 
Tribunal concluded that the expression “protection and constant security” does not imply that 
the protection relates only to the safety of physical property and that the radical changes in 
the regulatory framework and the insecurity arising from them are contrary to the standard 
of protection and constant security which, under the treaty, the state is obligated to offer to 
the investor.148 The limitation of such a broad interpretation should consist in the right of the 
state to pass legislation and regulate a particular matter, as it was determined in the case AES 
v. Hungary, in which the Arbitration Tribunal stated that the FPS standard can extend beyond 
the mere physical protection, but that at any rate “it does not protect against a state’s right to 
legislate or regulate in a manner which may negatively affect a claimant’s investment, provid-
ed that the state acts reasonably in the circumstances and with a view to achieving objectively 
rational public policy goals”.149
143  Ibid. para. 273.
144  Occidental v. Ecuador, op. cit. in note 51, para. 187.
145  For more details v.: Foster, op. cit. in note 34, pp. 1150–1151.
146  CME v. Czech, op. cit. in note 135, para. 613.
147  Foster, op. cit. in note 34, p. 1152.
148  National Grid plc v. the Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL case, Award from 3 November 2008 para. 189, https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf. Accessed on 5 January 2018. 
149  AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, Award, para. 13.3.2, https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0014-0.pdf. Accessed on 21 November 2018.
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6. CONCLUSION
As regards the distinguishing of the FPS standard from other standards of protection en-
joyed by foreign investors and investments, it is particularly important to distinguish it from 
the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard. Although the analysis of the contents of 
these two standards may show that there are frequent overlaps between them, the arbitration 
practice has principally taken the position that they are two distinct standards. This position 
appears to be correct because it seems fully illogical for the contracting parties to stipulate 
these two standards separately and in various provisions of their investment treaties if they 
did not in fact have different content. It can be concluded that the FET standard refers to the 
host state’s obligation to refrain from certain forms of action that could be detrimental for the 
investor or the investment, whereas the FPS standard represents the host state’s obligation to 
work actively on the creation of an environment that guarantees the security of the investor 
and the investment. Although the FPS standard evolved from the minimum protection stand-
ard, in relation to the minimum protection standard, the FPS is an independent protection 
standard that represents the lower limit of the state’s obligations in providing investors with 
protection and security, unless, of course, this was explicitly agreed otherwise in the relevant 
investment treaty. As for the liability standard, two situations are distinguished – first, those 
in which the damage to the investment or the investor is inflicted by the state itself or by the 
bodies for which the state is responsible and in which the state is always liable so that these 
cases exclude the implementation of the due diligence standard, and second, those in which 
the damage to the investment or the investor is inflicted by third persons, in which case the 
state must act with due diligence to prevent infringements and if infringements do take place, 
the state must with due diligence investigate the cases and penalize the perpetrators. It is also 
important to emphasize that this standard includes both physical protection and security not 
only regarding the actions of the state and of the subjects the state is responsible for, but also 
regarding the actions of third persons. If we accept the view  that this standard guarantees 
both legal protection and security, then it should be interpreted in a way that it primarily 
covers the actions of third persons, while regarding the actions of the state (especially in rela-
tion to securing a stable investment regime) the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard 
should be implemented. Therefore, since the FPS standard “covers” both physical and legal 
threats to the investment, following the interpretations of a number of arbitration tribunals, 
it also comprises the obligation of the state receiving the investment to secure legal protection 
for the investor by allowing a judicial procedure in which he would state his claim, and that 
this claim would then be processed under domestic and international law by an impartial and 
fair tribunal. However, it must be emphasized that the possible denial of justice would consti-
tute an infringement of the FET standard, whereas in the case where the established system 
of legal protection proves inefficient, this may constitute an infringement of the standard of 
obligation to secure efficient legal protection. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the greatest challenge in arbitration practice is to deter-
mine the scope of this standard, especially with respect to whether the protection and security 
the state is obligated to warrant includes only physical security or whether it also extends to 
legal security. The approach under which legal security and protection are included as well 
seems to be justified, particularly in the context of investment treaties in which all forms of 
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property are implied as investment, which means that nonmaterial property, such as intellec-
tual property that cannot be protected physically but only legally, is included as well. 
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STANDARD PUNE ZAŠTITE I SIGURNOSTI U MEĐUNARODNOM 
INVESTICIJSKOM PRAVU
Sažetak
Predmet istraživanja je analiza primjene standarda pune zaštite i sigurnosti stranih investicija 
u međunarodnoj aribtražnoj praksi. Riječ je o apsolutnom standardu koji sadrže gotovo svi 
međunarodni investicijski ugovori te koji se etablirao kroz arbitražnu praksu i to bez obzira 
na različitost jezičnih izričaja kojima se označava u investicijskim ugovorima. Objekti zaštite 
prema ovom standardu mogu biti i investitori i investicije, a njime se uspostavlja dvostruka 
obveza za države; s jedne strane to je obveza aktivnog djelovanja na sprečavanju i saniranju 
povrede ili kažnjavanju počinitelja, a s druge strane to je obveza suzdržavanja od poduzimanja 
bilo kakvih aktivnosti kojima bi se povrijedila strana investicija. Ovaj rad se posebice bavio 
trima pitanjima koja su odlučujuća za njegovu primjenu u praksi. Prvo je pitanje odnosa ovog 
standarda prema drugim standardima zaštite, posebice standardu pravičnog i poštenog tre-
tmana kao i prema minimalnom standardu zaštite koju uživaju strani investitori i njihove in-
vesticije prema međunarodnom običajnom pravu. Drugo je pitanje sadržaja standarda: odnosi 
li se standard samo na fizičku zaštitu i sigurnost ili uključuje i širu, pravnu zaštitu i regulator-
nu zaštitu, sigurnost i stabilnost. Treće pitanje se odnosi na stupanj zaštite i sigurnosti, od-
nosno podrazumijeva li ovaj standard objektivnu odgovornost države domaćina ili ona mora 
postupati s dužnom pažnjom, dakle ovisno o okolnostima svakog slučaja. U radu se analiziraju 
sve javno dostupne odluke međunarodnih arbitražnih sudova kao i znanstvena literatura koja 
se bavi ovim standardom te se ukazuje na prevladavajuće stavove o ova tri ključna pitanja te 
na njihove implikacije na zaštitu stranih investicija.
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